Free will from the viewpoint of teleological behaviorism.

Howard Rachlin
Author Information
  1. Howard Rachlin: Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794, USA. howard.rachlin@sunysb.edu

Abstract

A teleological and behavioral view is presented of the concept of free will. Free will is not something people essentially have or do not have. Instead, the following question is asked: Why does society find it useful to label some actions free and some actions not free? It is argued that the function of such labels is to aid in assigning responsibility to people for their actions. Responsibility in turn is useful in assigning rewards and punishments. The sort of actions that are typically seen as free are the same as those seen as self-controlled. Such actions are responsive to environmental contingencies of relatively wide temporal extent.

Grants

  1. 2R01 MH 044049 16/NIMH NIH HHS

MeSH Term

Behaviorism
Humans
Liability, Legal
Personal Autonomy
Social Responsibility
United States

Word Cloud

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