A study of the dynamics of multi-player games on small networks using territorial interactions.

Mark Broom, Charlotte Lafaye, Karan Pattni, Jan Rychtář
Author Information
  1. Mark Broom: Department of Mathematics, City University London, Northampton Square, London, EC1V 0HB, UK. Mark.Broom@city.ac.uk.
  2. Charlotte Lafaye: École Centrale Paris, Grande Voie des Vignes, 92 290, Châtenay-Malabry, France. charlotte.lafaye@student.ecp.fr.
  3. Karan Pattni: Department of Mathematics, City University London, Northampton Square, London, EC1V 0HB, UK. Karan.Pattni.1@city.ac.uk.
  4. Jan Rychtář: Department of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC, 27412, USA. rychtar@uncg.edu.

Abstract

Recently, the study of structured populations using models of evolutionary processes on graphs has begun to incorporate a more general type of interaction between individuals, allowing multi-player games to be played among the population. In this paper, we develop a birth-death dynamics for use in such models and consider the evolution of populations for special cases of very small graphs where we can easily identify all of the population states and carry out exact analyses. To do so, we study two multi-player games, a Hawk-Dove game and a public goods game. Our focus is on finding the fixation probability of an individual from one type, cooperator or defector in the case of the public goods game, within a population of the other type. We compare this value for both games on several graphs under different parameter values and assumptions, and identify some interesting general features of our model. In particular there is a very close relationship between the fixation probability and the mean temperature, with high temperatures helping fitter individuals and punishing unfit ones and so enhancing selection, whereas low temperatures give a levelling effect which suppresses selection.

Keywords

References

  1. J Theor Biol. 2009 Oct 21;260(4):581-8 [PMID: 19616013]
  2. Nature. 2006 May 25;441(7092):502-5 [PMID: 16724065]
  3. Nat Commun. 2014 Mar 06;5:3409 [PMID: 24598979]
  4. J Theor Biol. 2012 Jun 7;302:70-80 [PMID: 22406262]
  5. J Theor Biol. 2012 Jan 7;292:116-28 [PMID: 21907215]
  6. J Theor Biol. 1988 Jun 22;132(4):469-78 [PMID: 3226137]
  7. PLoS Comput Biol. 2015 Feb 26;11(2):e1004108 [PMID: 25719560]
  8. Theor Popul Biol. 2013 Mar;84:1-8 [PMID: 23186609]
  9. Proc Biol Sci. 2009 Apr 7;276(1660):1379-84 [PMID: 19141423]
  10. J Theor Biol. 2009 May 21;258(2):323-34 [PMID: 19490863]
  11. J Math Biol. 2014 Jan;68(1-2):109-43 [PMID: 23179131]
  12. Science. 2002 May 10;296(5570):1129-32 [PMID: 12004134]
  13. Bull Math Biol. 1997 Sep;59(5):931-52 [PMID: 9312326]
  14. Bull Math Biol. 2006 Nov;68(8):1923-44 [PMID: 17086490]
  15. PLoS Comput Biol. 2014 Apr 24;10(4):e1003567 [PMID: 24762474]
  16. Nature. 2005 Jan 20;433(7023):312-6 [PMID: 15662424]
  17. Phys Rev Lett. 2006 May 12;96(18):188104 [PMID: 16712402]
  18. J Evol Biol. 2006 May;19(3):726-33 [PMID: 16674569]
  19. Biosystems. 2012 Feb;107(2):66-80 [PMID: 22020107]
  20. Nature. 2008 Jul 10;454(7201):213-6 [PMID: 18615084]
  21. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2006 Mar 14;103(11):3994-8 [PMID: 16537474]
  22. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2010 Mar 23;107(12):5500-4 [PMID: 20212124]
  23. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2011 Jun 28;108(26):10421-5 [PMID: 21659631]

MeSH Term

Animals
Biological Evolution
Game Theory
Humans
Mathematical Concepts
Models, Biological
Population Dynamics
Territoriality

Word Cloud

Created with Highcharts 10.0.0gamesstudypopulationsgraphstypemulti-playerpopulationgameusingmodelsgeneralindividualsdynamicssmallidentifypublicgoodsfixationprobabilitytemperaturesselectiontheoryRecentlystructuredevolutionaryprocessesbegunincorporateinteractionallowingplayedamongpaperdevelopbirth-deathuseconsiderevolutionspecialcasescaneasilystatescarryexactanalysestwoHawk-DovefocusfindingindividualonecooperatordefectorcasewithincomparevalueseveraldifferentparametervaluesassumptionsinterestingfeaturesmodelparticularcloserelationshipmeantemperaturehighhelpingfitterpunishingunfitonesenhancingwhereaslowgivelevellingeffectsuppressesnetworksterritorialinteractionsEvolutionEvolutionarygraphGameStructuredTerritory

Similar Articles

Cited By