Illness and two meanings of phenomenology.

Horaţiu Traian Crişan, Ion Copoeru
Author Information
  1. Horaţiu Traian Crişan: Medical Education Department, Iuliu Haţieganu University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. ORCID
  2. Ion Copoeru: Faculty of History and Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania.

Abstract

BACKGROUND: When approaching medicine, phenomenology has at least two meanings that need to be distinguished in order to become relevant in its application to medical practice. Up to now, these two meanings have been overlapped by most of the scholarly literature. Therefore, the purpose of the article is to differentiate between them, thus endorsing their potential use in medical practice.
METHODS: The first meaning was instituted by Edmund Husserl and views phenomenology as transcendental, ie, as a transcendental rigorous science based on the unravelling of transcendental subjectivity/intersubjectivity. The second takes it more as a narrative enterprise, ie, as a description of personal subjective experience, thus seeming closer to other approaches to disease which can be found both in philosophy and other fields. Nevertheless, both provide advantages and disadvantages when it comes to approaching illness.
RESULTS: Neither of the two meanings can supersede the other and, consequently, neither of the two analogue forms of phenomenology can impose itself as the phenomenology of medicine.
CONCLUSION: It is important to clarify the consequences of applying each of the two understandings of phenomenology to medicine in the context of its current development. Our present inquiry concerns not merely the disentanglement of the status of what today's scholarly literature calls phenomenology of medicine in relation to meanings of phenomenology, but also the limits of applying phenomenology to the field of medicine.

Keywords

References

  1. Carel H. Phenomenology of Illness. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2016.
  2. Aho J, Aho K. Body Matters: A Phenomenology of Sickness, Disease and Illness. Lanham: Lexington Books; 2008.
  3. Toombs K. The Meaning of Illness. A Phenomenological Account of the Different Perspectives of Physician and Patient. Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers; 1992.
  4. Husserl E. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Evanston: Northwestern University Press; 1970.
  5. Gadamer H-G. Truth and Method. Glen-Doepel W, trans. In: Cumming J, Barden G, Translated Revised editor. London: Sheed and Ward; 1975:xvi.
  6. Svenaeus F. Illness as unhomelike being-in-the-world: Heidegger and the phenomenology of medicine. Med Health Care Philos. 2011;14:333.
  7. Gergel T. Medicine and the individual: is phenomenology the answer? J Eval Clin Pract. 2012;18(5):1102-1109, 1104.
  8. Heath C, Nicholls K. Body Movement and Speech in Medical Interaction (Studies in Emotion and Social Interaction). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1986.
  9. Morley J. It's always about the Epoche. Les Collectifs du Cercle Interdisciplinaire de Recherches Phenomenologiques. 2010;1:223-232.
  10. Todres L, Galvin K, Dahlberg K. Lifeworld-led healthcare: revisiting a humanising philosophy that integrates emerging trends. Med Health Care Philos. 2007;10(1):53-63.
  11. Munson R. Why medicine cannot be a science. J Med Philos. 1981;6(2):183-208.
  12. Gadamer H-G. In: Gaiger J, Walker N, eds. The Enigma of Health: the Art of Healing in a Scientific Age, Transl. Oxford: Polity Press; 1996.
  13. Husserl E, Sowa R, Vongehr T. Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie: Analysen des Unbewusstseinsund der Instinkte. Metaphysik. Späte Ethik (Vol. 42, Husserliana). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer; 2014.
  14. Fuchs T. Depression, intercorporeality, and interaffectivity. J Conscious Stud. 2013;20(7-8):219-238.
  15. Husserl E. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book. Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution. Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers; 1989.
  16. Merleau-Ponty M. Phenomenology of Perception. London/New York: Routledge & K. Paul/Humanities Press; 1974.
  17. Fuchs T. The phenomenology of shame, guilt and the body in body dysmorphic disorder and depression. J Phenomenol Psychol. 2002;33:223-243.
  18. Boublil E. The ethics of vulnerability and the phenomenology of interdependency. J Br Soc Phenomenol. 2018;49(3):183-192. https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2018.1434952.
  19. Gilson EC. The Ethics of Vulnerability: a Feminist Analysis of Social Life and Practice. New York: Routledge; 2014.
  20. Larrabee MJ. The time of trauma: Husserl's phenomenology and post-traumatic stress disorder. Hum Stud. 1995;18(4):351-366.
  21. Moskalewicz M. Disturbed temporalities. Insights from phenomenological psychiatry. Time Soc. 2016;25(2):234-252, 236.
  22. Moskalewicz M. Disturbed temporalities. Insights from phenomenological psychiatry. Time Soc. 2016;25(2):234-252, 237.
  23. Reach G. Temporality in chronic diseases and adherence to long-term therapies: from philosophy to science and back. Diabetes Metab. 2018;45:419-428.
  24. Fuchs T. Temporality and psychopathology. Phenomenol Cogn Sci. 2013;12:75-104. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-010-9189-4.
  25. For enactivism, see Gallagher S. Enactivist Interventions: Rethinking the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2017.
  26. von Peter S. The temporality of “chronic” mental illness. Cult Med Psychiatry. 2010;34(1):13-28.
  27. Morris D. Diabetes, chronic illness and the bodily roots of ecstatic temporality. Hum Stud. 2008;31(4):399-421.

MeSH Term

Humans
Narration
Philosophy

Word Cloud

Created with Highcharts 10.0.0phenomenologymedicinetwomeaningstranscendentalcanapproachingmedicalpracticescholarlyliteraturethusEdmundHusserliediseaseillnessapplyingBACKGROUND:leastneeddistinguishedorderbecomerelevantapplicationnowoverlappedThereforepurposearticledifferentiateendorsingpotentialuseMETHODS:firstmeaninginstitutedviewsrigoroussciencebasedunravellingsubjectivity/intersubjectivitysecondtakesnarrativeenterprisedescriptionpersonalsubjectiveexperienceseemingcloserapproachesfoundphilosophyfieldsNeverthelessprovideadvantagesdisadvantagescomesRESULTS:NeithersupersedeconsequentlyneitheranalogueformsimposeCONCLUSION:importantclarifyconsequencesunderstandingscontextcurrentdevelopmentpresentinquiryconcernsmerelydisentanglementstatustoday'scallsrelationalsolimitsfieldIllness

Similar Articles

Cited By