- Joanna Korman: The MITRE Corporation, United States of America. Electronic address: jkorman@mitre.org.
- Sangeet Khemlani: Navy Center for Applied Research in Artificial Intelligence, Naval Research Laboratory, United States of America.
Certain "generic" generalizations concern functions and purposes, e.g., cars are for driving. Some functional properties yield unacceptable teleological generics: for instance, cars are for parking seems false even though people park cars as often as they drive them. No theory of teleology in philosophy or psychology can explain what makes teleological generics acceptable. However, a recent theory (Prasada, 2017; Prasada & Dillingham, 2006; Prasada, Khemlani, Leslie, & Glucksberg, 2013) argues that a certain type of mental representation - a "principled" connection between a kind and a property - licenses generic generalizations. The account predicts that people should accept teleological generics that describe kinds and properties linked by a principled connection. Under the analysis, car bears a principled connection to driving (a car's primary purpose) and a non-principled connection to parking (an incidental consequence of driving). We report four experiments that tested and corroborated the theory's predictions, and we describe a regression analysis that rules out alternative accounts. We conclude by showing how the theory we developed can serve as the foundation for a general theory of teleological thinking.