Optimal tax selection under monopoly: emission tax vs carbon tax.

Pu-Yan Nie, Chan Wang, Hong-Xing Wen
Author Information
  1. Pu-Yan Nie: School of Economics, Institute of Guangdong High Quality Development, National Economics Research Center, Guangdong University of Finance & Economics (GDUFE), Guangzhou, 510320, People's Republic of China. ORCID
  2. Chan Wang: School of Economics, Institute of Guangdong High Quality Development, National Economics Research Center, Guangdong University of Finance & Economics (GDUFE), Guangzhou, 510320, People's Republic of China.
  3. Hong-Xing Wen: School of Economics, Institute of Guangdong High Quality Development, National Economics Research Center, Guangdong University of Finance & Economics (GDUFE), Guangzhou, 510320, People's Republic of China. pynie2013@163.com.

Abstract

Both carbon and emission taxes popularly exist all over the world. Therefore, it is important to compare carbon with emission tax. Under monopolization, this article establishes game theory model to compare carbon with emission tax. On one hand, both carbon and emission taxes reduce energy inputs, outputs, profits, and emission. On the other hand, under optimal taxes, two types of taxes affect identically. Under incomplete information carbon taxes seem more efficient than emission taxes. Based on these conclusions, we suggest to launch environmental tax based on emission function. Or the selection of taxes should consider the emission properties in production.

Keywords

References

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MeSH Term

Carbon
Carbon Dioxide
Taxes

Chemicals

Carbon Dioxide
Carbon

Word Cloud

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