How Do We Believe?

Steven A Sloman
Author Information
  1. Steven A Sloman: Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, & Psychological Sciences, Brown University.

Abstract

My first 30-odd years of research in cognitive science has been driven by an attempt to balance two facts about human thought that seem incompatible and two corresponding ways of understanding information processing. The facts are that, on one hand, human memories serve as sophisticated pattern recognition devices with great flexibility and an ability to generalize and predict as long as circumstances remain sufficiently familiar. On the other hand, we are capable of deploying an enormous variety of representational schemes that map closely onto articulable structure in the world and that support explanation even in unfamiliar circumstances. The contrasting ways of modeling such processes involve, first, more and more sophisticated associative models that capture progressively higher-order statistical structure and, second, more powerful representational languages for other sorts of structure, especially compositional and causal structure. My efforts to rectify these forces have taken me from the study of memory to induction and category knowledge to causal reasoning. In the process, I have consistently appealed to dual systems of thinking. I have come to realize that a key reason for our success as cognizers is that we rely on others for most of our information processing needs; we live in a community of knowledge. We make use of others both intuitively-by outsourcing much of our thinking without knowing we are doing it-and by deliberating with others.

Keywords

References

  1. Barbey, A. K., & Sloman, S. A. (2007). Base-rate respect: From ecological rationality to dual processes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 241-254.
  2. Bes, B., Sloman, S. A., Lucas, C. G., & Raufaste, E. (2012). Non-Bayesian inference: Causal structure trumps correlation. Cognitive Science, 36, 1178-1203.
  3. Busemeyer, J. R., & Bruza, P. D. (2012). Quantum models of cognition and decision. Cambridge University Press.
  4. Chaigneau, S. E., Barsalou, L. W., & Sloman, S.A. (2004). Assessing affordance and intention in the HIPE theory of function. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 601-625.
  5. Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  6. Craik, K. J. W. (1943). The nature of explanation. Cambridge: Macmillan.
  7. Craik, F. I., & Lockhart, R. S. (1972). Levels of processing: A framework for memory research. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 11(6), 671-684.
  8. Crawford, J. T., & Ruscio, J. (2021). Asking people to explain complex policies does not increase political moderation: three preregistered failures to closely replicate Fernbach, Rogers, Fox, and Sloman's (2013) findings. Psychological Science, 32(4), 611-621.
  9. Darlow, A. L., & Sloman, S. A. (2010). Two systems of reasoning: Architecture and relation to emotion. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 1(3), 382-392.
  10. De Neys, W., & Glumicic, T. (2008). Conflict monitoring in dual process theories of thinking. Cognition, 106(3), 1248-1299.
  11. Dunning, D. (2011). The Dunning-Kruger effect: On being ignorant of one's own ignorance. In J. M. Olson & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 44, pp. 247-296). Academic Press.
  12. Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V., & Heier, H. (1996). Individual differences in intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking styles. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 71, 390-405.
  13. Evans, J. S. B. T., & Over, D. E. (1996). Rationality and reasoning. Hove: Psychology Press.
  14. Fernbach, P. M., Darlow, A., & Sloman, S. A. (2010). Neglect of alternative causes in predictive but not diagnostic reasoning. Psychological Science, 21(3), 329-336.
  15. Fernbach, P. M., Darlow, A., & Sloman, S. A. (2011a). When good evidence goes bad: The weak evidence effect in judgment and decision-making. Cognition, 119, 459-467.
  16. Fernbach, P. M., Darlow, A., & Sloman, S. A. (2011b). Asymmetries in causal and diagnostic reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 140(2), 168-185.
  17. Fernbach, P. M., Hagmayer, Y., & Sloman, S. A. (2014). Effort denial in self-deception. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 123, 1-8.
  18. Fernbach, P. M., Rogers, T., Fox, C., & Sloman, S. A. (2013). Political extremism is supported by an illusion of understanding. Psychological Science, 24, 939-946.
  19. Fernbach, P. M., Sloman, S. A., St Louis, R., & Shube, J. N. (2013). Explanation fiends and foes: how mechanistic detail determines understanding and preference. Journal of Consumer Research, 39, 1115-1131.
  20. Fiedler, K. (1988). The dependence of the conjunction fallacy on subtle linguistic factors. Psychological Research, 50(2), 123-129.
  21. Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis. Cognition, 28(1-2), 3-71.
  22. Fricker, M., Graham, P. J., Henderson, D., & Pedersen, N. J. (2019). The Routledge handbook of social epistemology. Routledge.
  23. Gatewood, J. B. (2012). Cultural models, consensus analysis, and the social organization of knowledge. Topics in Cognitive Science, 4(3), 362-371.
  24. Gaviria, C., Corredor, J., & Rendon, Z. Z. (2017) “If it matters, I can explain it”: Social desirability of knowledge increases the illusion of explanatory depth. Paper presented at the 39th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
  25. Gennari, S. P., Sloman, S. A. Malt, B. C., & Fitch, W. T. (2002). Motion events in language and cognition. Cognition, 83, 49-79.
  26. Hagmayer, Y., & Sloman, S. A. (2009). Decision makers conceive of themselves as interveners, not observers. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 138, 22-38.
  27. Hemmatian, B., & Sloman, S. A. (2018). Community appeal: Explanation without information. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147(11), 1677-1712.
  28. Hemmatian, B., & Sloman, S. A. (2020). Two systems for thinking with a community: Outsourcing versus collaboration. In S. Elqayam, J. Evans, I. Douven, & N. Cruz (Eds.). Logic and Uncertainty in the Human Mind. New York: Routledge. 102-115.
  29. Henrich, J. (2015). Culture and social behavior. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 3, 84-89.
  30. Johnson, D. R., Murphy, M. P., & Messer, R. M. (2016). Reflecting on explanatory ability: A mechanism for detecting gaps in causal knowledge. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 145, 573-588.
  31. Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Macmillan.
  32. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972). Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness. Cognitive Psychology, 3(3), 430-454.
  33. Kahneman, D., Slovic, S. P., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.), (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  34. Keil, F. (2005). Doubt, deference, and deliberation: Understanding and using the division of cognitive labor. In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford studies in epistemology (pp. 143-166). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  35. Lake, B. M., Ullman, T. D., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Gershman, S. J. (2017). Building machines that learn and think like people. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 40, 1-72.
  36. Lawson, R. (2006). The science of cycology: Failures to understand how everyday objects work. Memory & Cognition, 34(8), 1667-1675.
  37. Lazer, D., Baum, M., Benkler, Y., Berinsky, A., Greenhill, K., Menczer, F., Metzger, M., Nyhan, B., Pennycook, G., Rothschild, D., Schudson, D., Sloman, S., Sunstein, C., Thorson, E., Watts, D., & Zittrain, J. (2018). The science of fake news. Science, 359(6380), 1094-1096.
  38. LeCun, Y., Bengio, Y., & Hinton, G. (2015). Deep learning. Nature, 521(7553), 436-444.
  39. Lerner, J. S., Li, Y., Valdesolo, P., & Kassam, K. S. (2015). Emotion and decision making. Annual Review of Psychology, 66, 799-823.
  40. Lippman, W. (1922). Public opinion. Harcourt, Brace, & Co.
  41. Malt, B. C., Sloman, S. A., Gennari, S., Shi, M., & Wang, Y. (1999). Knowing versus naming: Similarity and the linguistic categorization of artifacts. Journal of Memory and Language, 40, 230-262.
  42. McCulloch, W. S., & Pitts, W. (1943). A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, 5(4), 115-133.
  43. McKoon, G., Ratcliff, R., & Dell, G. S. (1986). A critical evaluation of the semantic-episodic distinction. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 12(2), 295-306.
  44. Meyers, E. A., Turpin, M. H., Białek, M, Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2020). Inducing feelings of ignorance makes people more receptive to expert (economist) opinion. Judgment and Decision Making, 15(6), 909-925.
  45. Minsky, M., & Papert, S. (1969). Perceptrons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  46. Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
  47. Osherson, D. N., Smith, E. E., Wilkie, O., Lopez, A., & Shafir, E. (1990). Category-based induction. Psychological Review, 97(2), 185.
  48. Park, J., & Sloman, S. A. (2013). Mechanistic beliefs determine adherence to the Markov property in causal reasoning. Cognitive Psychology, 67, 186-216.
  49. Pearl, J. (1988). Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems. Morgan Kaufmann.
  50. Pearl, J. (2000). Causality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  51. Putnam, H. (1975). The meaning of ‘meaning’. Philosophical Papers, 2, 131-193.
  52. Rabb, N., Fernbach, P. M., & Sloman, S. A. (2019). Individual representation in a community of knowledge. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 23, 891-902.
  53. Rabb, N., Han, J. J., & Sloman, S. A. (2020). How others drive our sense of understanding of policies. Behavioural Public Policy, 5(4), 454-479.
  54. Romney, A. K., Boyd, J. P., Moore, C. C., Batchelder, W. H., & Brazill, T. J. (1996). Culture as shared cognitive representations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 93(10), 4699-4705.
  55. Rottman, B. M., & Hastie, R. (2014). Reasoning about causal relationships: Inferences on causal networks. Psychological Bulletin, 140(1), 109.
  56. Rozenblit, L., & Keil, F. (2002). The misunderstood limits of folk science: An illusion of explanatory depth. Cognitive Science, 26(5), 521-562.
  57. Rumelhart, D., & McClelland, J. (1988). Parallel distributed processing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  58. Sloman, S. A. (1993). Feature-based induction. Cognitive Psychology, 25, 231-280.
  59. Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 3-22.
  60. Sloman, S. A. (1998). Categorical inference is not a tree: The myth of inheritance hierarchies. Cognitive Psychology, 35, 1-33.
  61. Sloman, S. A., & Fernbach, P. (2017). The knowledge illusion: Why we never think alone. New York: Riverhead Press.
  62. Sloman, S. A., Fernbach, P. M., & Hagmayer, Y. (2010). Self deception requires vagueness. Cognition, 115, 268-281.
  63. Sloman, S. A., & Hagmayer, Y. (2006). The causal psycho-logic of choice. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 407-412.
  64. Sloman, S. A., Koupers, D., & Yokum, D. (2021). Are voters influenced by the results of a consensus conference? Behavioural Public Policy, 1-22.
  65. Sloman, S. A., Love, B. C., & Ahn, W. (1998). Feature centrality and conceptual coherence. Cognitive Science, 22, 189-228.
  66. Sloman, S. A., Patterson, R., & Barbey, A. K. (2021). Cognitive neuroscience meets the community of knowledge. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 15.
  67. Sloman, S. A., Over, D., & Slovak, L. (2003). Frequency illusions and other fallacies. Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 91, 296-309.
  68. Sloman, S. A., & Rabb, N. (2016). Your understanding is my understanding: evidence for a community of knowledge. Psychological Science, 27, 1451-1460.
  69. Sloman, S., Zemla, J. C., Lagnado, D., Bechlivanidis, C., & Hemmatian, B. (2019). Are humans intuitive philosophers? In St. R. Grimm (Ed.),Varieties of understanding (pp. 231-250). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  70. Sperber, D. (1997). Intuitive and reflective beliefs. Mind & Language, 12(1), 67-83.
  71. Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1998). Individual differences in rational thought. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 127(2), 161.
  72. Tulving, E. (1983). Elements of episodic memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  73. Vitriol, J. A., & Marsh, J. K. (2018). The illusion of explanatory depth and endorsement of conspiracy beliefs. European Journal of Social Psychology, 48(7), 955-969.
  74. Voelkel, J. G., Brandt, M. J., & Colombo, M. (2018). I know that I know nothing: Can puncturing the illusion of explanatory depth overcome the relationship between attitudinal dissimilarity and prejudice? Comprehensive Results in Social Psychology, 3(1), 56-78.
  75. Waeber, P. O., Stoudmann, N., Langston, J. D., Ghazoul, J., WIlmé, L., Sayer, J., Nobre, C., Innes, J. L., Fernbach, P., Sloman, S. A., & Garcia, C. A. (2021). Choices we make in times of crisis. Sustainability, 13(6), 3578.
  76. Ward, A. F. (2013). Supernormal: How the Internet is changing our memories and our minds. Psychological Inquiry, 24(4), 341-348.
  77. Zeveney, A., & Marsh, J. (2016). The illusion of explanatory depth in a misunderstood field: The IOED in mental disorders. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.

MeSH Term

Cognition
Humans
Problem Solving

Word Cloud

Created with Highcharts 10.0.0structureknowledgeothersfirsttwofactshumanwaysinformationprocessinghandsophisticatedcircumstancesrepresentationalcausalreasoningsystemsthinking30-oddyearsresearchcognitivesciencedrivenattemptbalancethoughtseemincompatiblecorrespondingunderstandingonememoriesservepatternrecognitiondevicesgreatflexibilityabilitygeneralizepredictlongremainsufficientlyfamiliarcapabledeployingenormousvarietyschemesmapcloselyontoarticulableworldsupportexplanationevenunfamiliarcontrastingmodelingprocessesinvolveassociativemodelscaptureprogressivelyhigher-orderstatisticalsecondpowerfullanguagessortsespeciallycompositionaleffortsrectifyforcestakenstudymemoryinductioncategoryprocessconsistentlyappealeddualcomerealizekeyreasonsuccesscognizersrelyneedslivecommunitymakeuseintuitively-byoutsourcingmuchwithoutknowingit-anddeliberatingBelieve?BeliefCausalCommunityDualReasoning

Similar Articles

Cited By