Recent research suggests that reasoners are able to draw simple logical or probabilistic inferences relatively intuitively and automatically, a capacity that has been termed "logical intuition" (see, e.g., De Neys & Pennycook, 2019). A key finding in support of this interpretation is that conclusion validity consistently interferes with judgments of conclusion believability, suggesting that information about logical validity is available quickly enough to interfere with belief judgments. In this study, we examined whether logical intuitions arise because reasoners are sensitive to the logical features of a problem or another structural feature that just happens to align with logical validity. In three experiments ( = 113, 137, and 254), we presented participants with logical (determinate) and pseudological (indeterminate) arguments and asked them to judge the validity or believability of the conclusion. Logical arguments had determinately valid or invalid conclusions, whereas pseudological arguments were all logically indeterminate, but some were pseudovalid (possible strong arguments) and others pseudoinvalid (possible weak arguments). Experiments 1 and 2 used simple modus ponens and affirming the consequent structures; Experiment 3 used more complex denying the antecedent and modus tollens structures. In all three experiments, we found that pseudovalidity interfered with belief judgments to the same extent as real validity. Altogether, these findings suggest that while people are able to draw inferences intuitively, and these inferences impact belief judgments, they are not logical intuitions. Rather, the intuitive inferences are driven by the processing of more superficial structural features that happen to align with logical validity. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
