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Nature human behaviour
01, 2023;7 (1): 46-54.

Corrupt third parties undermine trust and prosocial behaviour between people.

Giuliana Spadaro, Catherine Molho, Jan-Willem Van Prooijen, Angelo Romano, Cristina O Mosso, Paul A M Van Lange
Author Information
  1. Giuliana Spadaro: Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. g.spadaro@vu.nl. ORCID
  2. Catherine Molho: Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, Toulouse, France. ORCID
  3. Jan-Willem Van Prooijen: Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. ORCID
  4. Angelo Romano: Department of Social, Economic and Organisational Psychology, Leiden University, Leiden, the Netherlands. ORCID
  5. Cristina O Mosso: Department of Psychology, University of Turin, Turin, Italy.
  6. Paul A M Van Lange: Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. ORCID
PMID: 36302996 DOI: 10.1038/s41562-022-01457-w

Abstract

Corruption is a pervasive phenomenon that affects the quality of institutions, undermines economic growth and exacerbates inequalities around the globe. Here we tested whether perceiving representatives of institutions as corrupt undermines trust and subsequent prosocial behaviour among strangers. We developed an experimental game paradigm modelling representatives as third-party punishers to manipulate or assess corruption and examine its relationship with trust and prosociality (trust behaviour, cooperation and generosity). In a sequential dyadic die-rolling task, the participants observed the dishonest behaviour of a target who would subsequently serve as a third-party punisher in a trust game (Study 1a, N = 540), in a prisoner's dilemma (Study 1b, N = 503) and in dictator games (Studies 2-4, N = 765, pre-registered). Across these five studies, perceiving a third party as corrupt undermined interpersonal trust and, in turn, prosocial behaviour. These findings contribute to our understanding of the critical role that representatives of institutions play in shaping cooperative relationships in modern societies.

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MeSH Term

Humans
Trust
Cooperative Behavior
Altruism
Games, Experimental
Prisoner Dilemma
Journal Article Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
Article has an altmetric score of 147

Word Cloud

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