- Philip LaPorte: Department of Mathematics, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA. ORCID
- Martin A Nowak: Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
Many evolutionary processes occur in phenotype spaces which are continuous. It is therefore of interest to explore how selection operates in continuous spaces. One approach is adaptive dynamics, which assumes that mutants are local. Here we study a different process which also allows non-local mutants. We assume that a resident population is challenged by an invader who uses a strategy chosen from a random distribution on the space of all strategies. We study the repeated donation game of direct reciprocity. We consider reactive strategies given by two probabilities, denoting respectively the probability to cooperate after the co-player has cooperated or defected. The strategy space is the unit square. We derive analytic formulae for the stationary distribution of evolutionary dynamics and for the average cooperation rate as function of the cost-to-benefit ratio. For positive reactive strategies, we prove that cooperation is more abundant than defection if the area of the cooperative region is greater than 1/2 which is equivalent to benefit, , divided by cost, , exceeding [Formula: see text]. We introduce the concept of strategies that are stable with probability one. We also study an extended process and discuss other games.