Solving Congestion in the Plastic Surgery Match: A Game Theory Analysis.

Felipe Molina Burbano, Amy Yao, Nikki Burish, Michael Ingargiola, Matthew Freeman, Jeffrey Stock, Peter J Taub
Author Information
  1. Felipe Molina Burbano: From the Division of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery and the Department of Urology, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai.
  2. Amy Yao: From the Division of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery and the Department of Urology, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai.
  3. Nikki Burish: From the Division of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery and the Department of Urology, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai.
  4. Michael Ingargiola: From the Division of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery and the Department of Urology, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai.
  5. Matthew Freeman: From the Division of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery and the Department of Urology, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai.
  6. Jeffrey Stock: From the Division of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery and the Department of Urology, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai.
  7. Peter J Taub: From the Division of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery and the Department of Urology, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai.

Abstract

Plastic and reconstructive Surgery is among the most competitive specialties in the residency match. Applicants seeking to maximize their chances of a successful match often submit numerous applications to the National Residency Matching Program. It is not uncommon for those applying to plastic and reconstructive Surgery to apply to every program. The high application volume imparts significant time and financial burden for applicants and programs alike. Furthermore, it makes distinguishing between applicants with a genuine interest in a specific program and those who are merely hoping to improve their chances vastly more difficult. The authors sought to characterize trends in the match rate, as the number of integrated plastic and reconstructive Surgery programs continues to increase. Furthermore, they reviewed the literature on game theory for possible solutions to residency application congestion. The authors propose the use of the game theory model to explain the observed results and show why an application limit is the most reasonable approach to address this issue.

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MeSH Term

Game Theory
Humans
Internship and Residency
Models, Theoretical
School Admission Criteria
Surgery, Plastic
United States

Word Cloud

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